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Scholarly Abstract 
In recent years there has been increased attention to the importance of gender in securing long-
term development goals. Consensus has now been reached that increasing the social status and 
economic capacity of women is an effective way of improving outcomes. The subject of this 
paper is the viability of the ‘Gender and Development’ (GAD) paradigm as a means of 
establishing socially and politically sustainable gains for women in developing countries. The 
author examines the GAD paradigm using the case study of ‘Gender Mainstreaming’ in the 
reconstruction and development of Afghanistan since 2001. Through an analysis of some of the 
problems encountered so far, the author questions whether such an approach is likely to actually 
result in long-term, sustainable improvement in that country. Three key issues include: 
marginalization of ‘Gender Mainstreaming’; lack of state capacity; and failures to fully integrate 
programs into social and cultural contexts. Though reconstruction efforts have clearly resulted in 
some improvement, it is argued that it is unclear whether such an approach will lead to long-term 
progress. Rather, there is strong evidence that GAD can actually contribute to the further 
politicization of gender and result in a backlash against reforms. Ultimately, the goals that the 
GAD paradigm attempts to achieve are extremely difficult to translate into effective practice, 
especially in highly volatile and politicized situations. In conclusion, the author finds that 
sustainable and transformative change may be elusive if one simply applies new aims to old 
models of aid provision. 
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Author’s Note 
A great deal of feminist scholarship focuses either on how the world we live in is rife with 
inequality and injustice. What is often missing in between however is a road map for how it may 
be possible to overcome these problems to envision and create a better future. The field of 
development, on the other hand, tends to be concerned primarily with pragmatic questions of 
how we can improve the lives of people around the world. In this context, the ‘end point’ of such 
efforts is often uncritically assumed. A feminist approach to development attempts in many ways 
to bring together these two disparate tendencies, combining a critical standpoint with a pragmatic 
approach. However appealing such an approach may seem, however, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that feminist models of development have often proved incredibly problematic, both in theory 
and practice. A feminist approach to development reveals particular challenges for the goals of 
sustainable development. For, while it is argued that gender equality is a necessary step in 
creating sustainable development, how to create such change in socially and politically 
sustainable ways remains unresolved. The holistic and transformative aims that gender-sensitive 
approaches to development aspire to are incredibly difficult to realize. In the end, to achieve 
these, it may be necessary to conceive of a wholly different model of aid provision. 
  
Keywords: Gender, Development, Mainstreaming, Afghanistan, Post-conflict Reconstruction 
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GAD and Gender Mainstreaming: A Pathway to Sustainable Development? 
  
Until recently, the issue of gender1 has tended to be ignored and undervalued by the 
development community. Providers of aid have paid little attention to the particular needs and 
problems of women and likewise have failed to recognize the importance of their well being for 
the overall success of the societies in which they live. Since the 1970s however, a shift in 
thinking has been under way. Ester Boserup’s landmark study on agricultural production in Sub-
Saharan Africa, published in 1970, pointed to the crucial role of women’s labor in sustaining 
local and international economies.2 Since then, feminist scholars across a range of disciplines 
have sought to show how women act as essential players in the economic, social and cultural 
development of their societies and how gender-sensitivity is a crucial part of sustainable 
development.3 As a result of this work there has been a monumental shift in attitudes among 
development practitioners. Increasingly, aid donors, providers and scholars alike have come to 
recognize the links between the status and welfare of women and a whole range of development 
goals, from political stability and economic growth to environmental sustainability. As the 1995 
Beijing Platform for Action proclaimed: “The advancement of women and the achievement of 
equality between women and men are a matter of human rights and a condition for social 
justice… they are the only way to build a sustainable, just and developed society.”4 Promoting 
‘gender equality’ would be identified as a key component of the UN’s Millennium Development 
Goals.5 More recently, the passage of UN Resolution 1325, which declared that the 
empowerment of women was critical to the processes of both peacemaking and democratization, 
has affirmed this view.6 Across the board, investment in a country’s women has proven to be one 
of the most effective and cost-efficient means of generating substantial and sustainable 
development gains.7  
A significant manifestation of the growing recognition of the special role women play in 
development has been the creation of new gender-sensitive paradigms for aid provision. One of 
the most important of these is the ‘Gender and Development’ (GAD) approach, which evolved in 
the late 1980s in response to the limitations of earlier attempts at feminist development practice, 
such as a continued marginalization of women and a limited capacity for transformational 
change.8 Defined and promoted by the theoretical work of both ‘Third World’ and socialist 
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feminists in the ‘West,’ the GAD approach argues that development programs cannot be 
successful if they only take on economic problems in isolation of the social and political 
structures that underlie all transactions. Individual capacity to command and allocate resources is 
just as important as access to them in the first place.9 Thus, drawing on the theoretical 
foundations of radical feminism,10 and in contrast with other paradigms for women and 
development, which have tended to focus on women in isolation from larger development 
programs, GAD draws attention to how sexual difference is constructed and inscribed via gender 
on social, political and economic relations within the communities where development programs 
function and to the ways in which these relations play a role in the need for assistance in the first 
place.11 As a result, it seeks not just to meet basic, material needs but to make women (and men) 
aid recipients aware of the structural inequalities that lead to poverty and to engage them as 
agents in their own improvement and thereby create more lasting and sustainable change.12 In 
other words, the GAD approach goes beyond simply trying to integrate women into 
development, but argues that the whole mode by which development operates must be 
transformed in order to take on social and political transformation in addition to economic 
reallocation.13 In this way, GAD aims to change the social, economic and political structures that 
contribute to the need for external assistance in the first place—empowering women in all 
aspects of their lives as a means of strengthening the foundations of their societies.14   
The GAD framework offers a new and appealing way of thinking about the goals and 
means of development because it presents the recipients of aid in a more holistic light and 
doesn’t shy away from culture and politics.15 One key strategy for the implementation of a GAD 
approach that has emerged is ‘Gender Mainstreaming,’ which seeks to end the oppositional 
dualism between ‘women’s issues’ and the rest of politics, economics and culture by bringing 
women ‘in from the periphery.’16 On one level, this involves making the structures of 
government and civil society sensitive to women’s needs. However, at the same time, 
mainstreaming also means bringing women into the public sphere by increasing their 
participation. Nonetheless, putting a Gender Mainstreaming program into practice poses a 
number of difficult problems. How should international development programs go about 
implementing this kind of approach? Should change come from the bottom up through the 
grassroots work of non-governmental organizations? Or, can it only come from the top down via 
aggressive intervention from the state? The possibility of this kind of transformation implies a 
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process of re-structuring social and economic relations on a broad scale. How does one actually 
set in motion this sort of process and even then, how can we measure its ‘progress’?17 Finally, 
does the whole idea of directing this kind of cultural and political change from the outside (as the 
whole development framework implies) render such a program problematically imperialistic? 
Despite a perceptible shift in thinking within the international community towards a 
gender-sensitive approach, GAD has largely remained on the sidelines of large-scale 
development programs.18 However, one exception has been the application of a GAD  approach 
to the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan since 2001, primarily through the strategy 
of Gender Mainstreaming.19 In this case, the goal of improving the status and welfare of Afghan 
women was defined both as a central goal of development in of itself and as a means of 
achieving greater efficiency for resources spent. In accordance, a flurry of Gender 
Mainstreaming programs and initiatives would emerge in the years immediately following the 
overthrow of the Taliban. However, realities on the ground in the country have proven that the 
broader transformative agenda that GAD embodies is extremely difficult to translate into 
effective practice. While programs may have helped improve the welfare of Afghan women in 
some contexts up to the present, it is unclear whether a GAD approach articulated through 
Gender Mainstreaming is capable of ensuring the social and political sustainability of such 
changes.   
 After decades of relative isolation, Afghanistan reappeared on the geopolitical stage in late 
2001, when in the wake of the September 11th bombings in the USA it became the first of a 
series of targets in the international ‘War on Terror.’20  Ironically, though the terrorism that the 
United States was reacting against had little to do with gender specifically, issues of culture, 
religion and political rights became the sites where the U.S. clash with Al Queda could be 
measured, and the issue of ‘women’s rights’ in Afghanistan became a focus of attention. Thus, 
Afghan women were suddenly thrown into the international limelight as the embodiment of the 
kind of oppression Muslim terrorist groups like Al Queda allegedly intended to impose on the 
entire world. As First Lady Laura Bush proclaimed: “The brutal oppression of women is a 
central goal of the terrorists…[The regime in Afghanistan] is the world the terrorists would like 
to impose on the rest of us.”21 In this vein, the Bush Administration quickly adopted a kind of 
pseudo-feminist rhetoric in its framing of the Afghanistan invasion. Using the emancipation of 
Afghan women as a means of justifying the war,22 the Bush Administration began to insist “the 
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fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women.”23 Accordingly, in the 
aftermath of the fall of the Taliban, many saw the ‘liberation’ of Afghanistan’s women as a 
litmus test for the success of the re-building and ‘modernization’ of this former ‘failed state.’ It is 
upon this backdrop that the GAD approach was adopted as a guiding principle in the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan, and that Afghanistan itself became a sort of testing ground for the 
application of GAD on a broad scale.  
 With the establishment of a new government in Afghanistan pursuant to the Bonn 
Agreement, which was signed in December 2001, advancing women’s status and welfare by a 
variety of mechanisms became a central tenet of state-building and development strategy in 
Afghanistan, with the express goal of reversing Taliban era restrictions on women’s lives and 
furthering their advancement in Afghan society overall.24 As the new government’s National 
Development Strategy proclaimed: “The government’s goal is to eliminate discrimination against 
women, develop their human capital and promote their leadership in order to guarantee their full 
and equal participation in all aspects of life in Afghanistan.”25 Likewise, many of the key donors 
in the reconstruction also took up an aggressive GAD standpoint, with USAID for example 
proclaiming that "that gender be integrated into all of the work of USAID in order to contribute 
to effective programs, social equity, and sustainable change."26 The development program in 
Afghanistan has thus sought to apply a GAD framework in several ways, each attempting to 
engage women’s strategic as well as immediate needs. 
 Building from the framework established by the Bonn Agreement, Gender Mainstreaming 
in Afghanistan since 2001 has taken a number of forms. One of the most prominent of these has 
been in the political sphere: from the writing of specific rights and protections for women into 
the state’s new Constitution and other laws, to mandating minimum levels of female 
participation in the country’s new governing structures via a gender quota system for the election 
of parliamentary representatives, which reserves a quarter of seats for female candidates.27  Due 
in large part to such policies and laws, the percentage of women representatives and civil 
servants in the new Afghan government is relatively high, even compared to more-developed 
countries in the West.28 Likewise, a number of specific institutional organizations and 
mechanisms have been created with the aim of furthering Gender Mainstreaming and women’s 
advancement, namely: the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, charged with developing and 
implementing mainstreaming projects into other government ministries; the Office of the State 
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Minister for Women, responsible for advising the president; the Afghanistan Independent Human 
Rights Commission, which both ensures that Afghan laws are in agreement with international 
standards and monitors conditions within the country; and a Gender Advisory Group to help with 
mainstreaming and work with donors.29  At the same time, development projects, particularly in 
the urban area of Kabul, have spent considerable energy raising the level of participation among 
Afghani women and getting them involved as much as possible in community politics.30 Finally, 
a significant component of Mainstreaming efforts have been ‘gender training’ projects—often in 
tandem with other programs directed at ‘capacity building’—which attempt to educate and 
inform both ordinary Afghans as well as community leaders about ‘gender issues’ and thereby 
gain their appreciation and support for the goal of female empowerment in that country.31 
 On the surface of things, Gender Mainstreaming has had a significant impact on the 
development of the new Afghan state. For example, the new government has proclaimed 
establishment of a “broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative 
government” one of its central goals.32 Across the country, women are entering the public 
sphere—from thousands of girls returning to newly constructed schools to the large-scale 
participation of women in the nation’s first presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and 
2005. The new Constitution proclaims formal equality and non-discrimination between women 
and men, and in the new National Assembly over a quarter of seats are held by women, a vast 
improvement over the three percent who held seats in 1990. Similarly, ten percent of government 
employees at the ministerial level today are women.33 Likewise, the building of hospitals and 
schools, often with a focus on providing specially for women’s basic needs, have played a real 
and important role in healing wounds left by decades of war.34  
 However despite these apparent successes, serious problems hamper the advancement of 
the GAD agenda, resulting in significant gaps between women’s formal and substantiative rights. 
One reason for this may be the structural nature of the gender inequalities Gender Mainstreaming 
seeks to overcome. For, even though the need for Mainstreaming has been well recognized in 
Afghanistan, efforts to put the approach into practice have inevitably been subject to the same 
forces that make it necessary in the first place. Despite a large amount of fanfare on the progress 
of women’s rights in the country, Mainstreaming has tended to be sidelined—made a feature of 
‘special initiatives’ aimed at certain women, rather than integrated into the whole country’s 
development and democratization.35  For example, while the new government promptly 
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established the new Ministry of Women’s Affairs as stipulated by the Bonn Agreement, it gave 
the new ministry neither the legal jurisdiction nor the powers needed to implement its policies.36 
Similarly, though the new Constitution proclaims equal rights, many have criticized its overall 
weak language and many loopholes, which ultimately undermine and weaken the legal 
protections it affords.37 At the same time those programs aimed at creating this transformation 
have tended to be marginalized in the funding they have received from international donors, as 
the vast majority of funds have been diverted instead to the nation’s security needs.38  These 
days, it appears that Gender Mainstreaming (and with it the whole GAD agenda in Afghanistan) 
has been progressively left behind in favor of other concerns. As one NGO worker has noted: “In 
2001, after the fall of the Taliban, improving the rights of Afghan women was at the top of the 
international agenda; [Now], despite many well-intentioned programs for women, women’s 
human rights appears to be more of an afterthought.”39 Indeed, even the United States, which was 
integrally involved with the advancement of women in Afghanistan in the past, seems to have 
lost interest. In USAID's 2008 "Afghanistan Strategy" no mention was made whatsoever of the 
particular role of Gender Mainstreaming or of women's empowerment at all as a key goal or 
benchmark for progress in that country.40 Indeed, the last time USAID published any report 
specific to gender issues in Afghanistan was in 2006. While the War in Iraq has largely taken 
over the focus of US foreign policy and development assistance, the United States apparent 
special concern for Afghan women also seems to have diminished significantly. 
 Moreover, even those Mainstreaming efforts that have been fully implemented have had 
debatable success.  For example, despite aggressive efforts to bring women into the formal 
structures of governance, it is reported by observers that even when they do take part, women 
continue to be excluded from the actual decision-making processes where policy is made, raising 
questions about the actual impact of such measures.41 For example, despite a significant female 
presence at the nation’s first constitutional assembly (“Loya Jirga”), it was extremely difficult for 
these women to either work together or push ‘women’s issues’ to the front of the agenda.42  In 
fact, some argue, rather than create community support for the empowerment of Afghan women, 
there is some evidence that Mainstreaming has had the opposite effect, especially among those 
ordinary Afghans for whom the Western vision of the oppressed Afghan woman has never held 
much resonance. Instead, many seem to find this focus disingenuous and troubling. As one 
woman lamented: “Right now our women are all over the place, being used for politics, used like 
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dolls… Every event they are in front of the TV, the camera. They are being used just to show 
that women were there.”43 Despite large scale attempts to normalize the involvement of women 
in public decision-making, the attitudes of most Afghans appear unchanged; they feel that only 
‘educated’ women (who make up a very tiny portion of the overall population) ought to 
participate and then only in certain ways, with men remaining ultimately dominant. Likewise, 
even as women have been increasingly encouraged to take public roles, using these to actually 
challenge gender inequality has proven to be extremely difficult. More often than not, these 
women have tended to find it necessary to accede to more traditional norms in order to be 
accepted as legitimate.44 Finally, despite all the programs targeting them, women in Afghanistan 
remain for the most part politically disengaged—far less likely than men to be aware of 
important political developments or to vote.45 
 These realities highlight the very real tensions inherent any time development projects 
become intertwined with the complex politics of state building.  For even as gender has become 
a dominant rhetorical theme, translating this rhetoric into effective practice in an environment 
that lacks both political strength and stability has proven exceedingly difficult.46 Decades of 
conflict and turmoil have left Afghanistan a largely fragmented nation, split along regional, 
ethnic and even family lines, with many parts of the country largely outside of the national 
government’s influence and control.47 Enforcing a national policy on women’s rights in the 
nation’s periphery has thus posed a monumental task that the new Afghan government has not 
always been able to carry out. Likewise, while Mainstreaming may have helped make some more 
sensitive to women’s issues, the goals of Gender Mainstreaming have overall remained a 
peripheral concern in Afghan politics. In the end, even as the new government has made genuine 
attempts to promote gender equality, these ideals have had to compete with the necessity of 
political maneuvering and coalition building.48 Ultimately, in a context where the national 
government itself is incredibly weak and the judiciary very limited in capacity, the appropriate-
ness of the kind of top-down approach that Gender Mainstreaming requires has in many ways 
proven questionable.49 
 The effectiveness of Gender Mainstreaming as a means to social and cultural 
transformation in Afghanistan has also been limited by the nature of Mainstreaming itself. For, 
while it has clearly been effective at increasing the participation of at least some women in the 
public sphere, Mainstreaming is less adept at addressing gender inequalities in the private sphere.  
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Thus, even with the participation of women in government at an all time high and many new 
laws and policies aimed at combating them, problems like forced marriage and domestic 
violence have continued unabated.50 One reason for this may be the way that Mainstreaming 
tends to focus on certain groups of women in isolation from the social ties that are so central to 
the way gender is defined and expressed in Afghan culture.51 For Afghans, ‘woman’ is an 
interconnected and contested source of Afghan identity and political orientation that is seen as 
important and deserving of protection: “Women have always been, and remain, wards of their 
families and communities...The domestic domain and the control of women are among the most 
jealously guarded areas in the reproduction of sub-national identities.”52 Conflicts over gender in 
Afghanistan have always been related to larger socio-political tensions, such as that between 
those Western-educated elite Afghans in urban areas who today act as the representative voice of 
the whole of Afghanistan in the development process,53 and the conservative majority of the 
country which live in rural areas.54 Likewise, Afghans understand the identity ‘woman’ in far 
more complex, relational terms than acknowledged by the dominant stereotype of ‘oppressed 
victim.’55 As one ethnographer has argued:   
Contemporary scholarly and humanitarian discourses evolve around the victimisation of 
Afghan women, employ culture as a deterministic explanatory device and use Islamic 
fundamentalism as represented by the Taliban as a scapegoat to summarily account for all 
forms of distress in Afghanistan…[These tropes fail] to account for how gender has been 
inflected by violence, war and occupation and subsequently what work war and its 
accompanying forces have performed on social institutions, family structure and 
individual subjectivities.56 
 
 Development projects that attempt to target women, especially certain classes of women such as 
widows, in isolation from these relational fields results in a situation where development projects 
neither acknowledge the experiences of Afghans--men and women alike--nor respond to the true 
dimensions of their needs. 57 
Indeed, despite its emphasis on ‘gender’ (instead of simply on ‘women’) men have been 
almost entirely left out the transformative agenda. As one 2004 survey found, no development 
workers interviewed could come up with a single Mainstreaming program that meaningfully 
incorporated men as well as women. If the Mainstreaming project in Afghanistan ultimately fails 
to include the whole of Afghan society in its transformative project, it risks inciting resentment 
and frustration and setting off a reactionary response that is all-too-familiar. As one Afghan man 
reported, to most men Gender Mainstreaming means: “increasing the power of women while 
Brenner 12 
decreasing the power of men. Women over men.”58 Such attitudes are further deepened by the 
mistrust and hostility that many Afghans feel toward foreign aid and development in general, as 
unhelpful and self-serving, or as the popular Afghan phrase puts it: “like cows who drink their 
own milk.”59 While it may be too early to gauge the full political consequences of such 
perceptions, there is increasing evidence that a backlash is already occurring, often in the form of 
increased violence against women, both in the home and in public spaces.60  
 In the end, the big problem may not be the mainstreaming of Afghan women into the 
public sphere, but the incorporation of the country’s men and women into a more holistic and 
gender-aware development program that not only seeks to increase their participation, but that 
aims to empower women along with their whole families and communities so that they can live 
better and more secure lives. Sadly, Gender Mainstreaming as it has been realized in Afghanistan 
today has tended to fall short of this goal. As one scholar has criticized: Gender Mainstreaming 
programs in Afghanistan today seem like they “may have more to do with international politics 
and the agendas of external agencies than with meeting the felt and expressed needs of the 
majority of Afghan women.”61 This is extremely problematic, because not only do such 
perceptions lead to a sense that the goals of GAD are illegitimate, they risk inciting a sense 
among Afghans that the prospect of changes to gender relations at all poses a threat to the very 
fabric of Afghan society. The project of creating greater gender equality in Afghanistan is not a 
new one, and in the past such attempts have often been seen in just such a light and been faced 
with stiff resistance.62 The danger of inciting a backlash is very real and should be taken very 
seriously by proponents of Gender Mainstreaming today in Afghanistan. More than anything, 
Afghans must view Mainstreaming with a sense of ‘ownership’ as something legitimately rooted 
in their own culture and traditions, not as a pet project of outside aid groups, no matter how well 
meaning they are. 
 In conclusion, Gender Mainstreaming has not lived up to its promise as the means of 
transforming gender in post-war Afghanistan. One reason for this is the way Mainstreaming has 
been executed as a policy. For, in the overall reconstruction effort Mainstreaming has tended to 
be marginalized and this lack of commitment has only worsened over time. Rather than 
becoming established as a new way of doing things, there has instead been a gradual decline in 
attention and resources paid to the advancement of women and a return instead to traditional, 
technocratic development programs that ignore gender completely. While an ongoing lack of 
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security in Afghanistan due to continued fighting has no doubt played some part in this trend, 
one cannot wonder if this may also be due to the fact that the novelty of GAD has worn a bit thin 
for the countries and organizations that have so far been the lead drivers of development policy 
in the country. Indeed, as the attention of the United States and many of its allies has 
progressively turned toward Iraq, resources directed toward women in that conflict and for that 
matter any discussion of GAD at all have been almost entirely absent.63 Such a lack of sustained 
interest may be one of the biggest barriers of all for the success of GAD and Gender 
Mainstreaming in Afghanistan; after all, if there is one thing more than all others that large-scale 
societal transformations require, it is a sustained and long-term commitment. As it stands today, 
the lack of such commitment in Afghanistan is creating a real danger that GAD and with it 
Gender Mainstreaming will become seen as little more than a fashionable set of ‘buzz words’ 
devoid of actual meaning.64 
However, not all of the problems I have highlighted in this paper can be attributed to lack 
of commitment and effective implementation. Some are related to the inherent limitations of 
Mainstreaming as a strategy. GAD cannot be effective in transforming gender relations if it only 
means placing women in the political arena and ‘gender’ on the agenda, or as some have said 
‘adding women and stirring.’ Other structural dimensions of gender inequality such as family 
organization and economic independence must also be addressed, and Mainstreaming is in many 
ways not well suited to addressing these. As a result of such limitations, some have raised the 
question of whether Mainstreaming, or in fact any strategy of GAD will ever manage to 
accomplish the goal of long-term sustainable change. For, a fundamental transformation of 
‘gender’ may not be unattainable via the kinds of externally driven, technocratic-focused projects 
that make up the bulk of development practice today. As one scholar has noted: 
A more creative engagement with the complexities of the politics of gender, which is laden 
[there] as elsewhere with its own historical baggage, would mandate a contextual, non-
technocratic approach which requires temporal horizons, levels of commitment and types 
of coalition building and collaborating which far exceed the time frames and resources of 
‘project’ cycles.65  
 
More often than not, there has been a tendency in recent years for organizations to take up the 
language of GAD while continuing to apply the same old kinds of strategies to their work. In 
many ways, one can argue that Mainstreaming is exactly this sort of old strategy. For though the 
concept of Gender Mainstreaming may fit well into the theoretical aims of GAD, its tendency to 
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take this kind of top-down form may mean it is not an ideal strategy for achieving these goals. 
For, by focusing almost exclusively on formal equality, it fails to take into account the vast 
complexity that a successful transformation of gender relations would actually require. Gender 
Mainstreaming is an inherently ‘blunt’ instrument, where something much more flexible, 
creative and grassroots-oriented is needed. 
 In the end, however, one should not take the limitations of Gender Mainstreaming to mean 
that GAD simply cannot work. Gender Mainstreaming remains only one tactic for achieving 
gender transformation, and as it stands today, there have been so few attempts at implementing a 
large-scale GAD development program it is impossible to say what outcomes are actually 
possible. Moreover, those few attempts that have been made, such as in Afghanistan, have not 
had nearly enough time to truly reveal all their impacts. Before we can close the book on GAD, 
far more creative and committed attempts to implement this approach will be needed. For, 
ultimately, if GAD can ever hope to be successful, one thing is clear: it will require a whole 
range of localized tactics rather than one single strategy, and many years of stanch work, not just 
a few. However, in spite of the many challenges its application in Afghanistan has revealed, 
GAD remains a crucial link for achieving more sustainable development everywhere in the 
world. For, in order to create truly sustainable outcomes, development must encompass and 
uplift whole communities, women as well as men, and to this end GAD presents the most 
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